【明報文章】Iran and the United States have engaged in rare nuclear negotiations. The goal is clear: to achieve a new agreement which would address Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Washington wants a constrained Islamic Republic, while Tehran wants a significant relieve from decades-long sanctions, which have crippled the country’s economy.
At the same time, Iran does not want its entire nuclear program to go as it allows the country to retain a powerful bargaining chip in future negotiations with its rivals. The Iranian tactic has been clear all along. The nuclear program was used for strategic purposes to show that the country is able to attain an ultimate weapon to defend itself against its enemies. Tehran might not have been intent to create a nuclear weapon in the beginning and just wanted to show that it retains capabilities to do so to preclude geopolitical threats in the future.
There was another element in the arsenal of the Islamic Republic. The Axis of Resistance – sprawling coalition of non-state actors across the Middle East – was seen as an effective instrument to keep pressure on Israel and the United States and distract them from mounting major pressure campaign on Iran. Together, the Axis and the developing nuclear program, constituted Iran’s so-called forward-defense strategic thinking. It had worked for decades and peaked in 2023 just before Hamas, one of the crucial members of the Axis, attacked Israel.
By the end of 2024, however, it became clear that the Axis could not withstand Israel’s power and prowess. Additionally, the fall of the Assad dynasty in Syria removed a critical bridge between Iran and Hezbollah which operates in Lebanon. The land corridor the Islamic Republic spent so much resources to build lost its precious link. Israel not only battered the members of the Axis but even Iranian territory itself which showcased the depth and reach the Israeli weaponry had.
The Axis is down but not out, though. Tehran now needs time to reconstitute its power and re-arrange the operations of the non-state alliance. The Houthis are expected to play greater role and Iran also seeks greater coordination among Iraq-based non-states groups. Nevertheless, the Axis has been badly hurt. On top of these major challenges, there is also the United States which resumed the maximum pressure campaign on Iran with the aim to stiffle its profitable oil exports. Washington has also signaled that it would be open to using the military power against Iran’s nuclear capabilities in case the Tehran does not make concessions. It might be bluffing but it serves the purpose of geopolitical pressure.
These unfavorable conditions pushed Iran not only to agree to the negotiations with Washington, but even express high hopes for rapprochement. The United States is likewise interested in a meaningful progress with Iran. After all, Washington intends to re-orient its foreign policy fully from the West Asia and the Black Sea region toward the Indo-Pacific region. The logic is sound here – it is China that is considered as the most potent geopolitical competitor in America’s political establishment. This is by far a bipartisan consensus guaranteeing long-term nature of Washington’s foreign policy.
Relatedly, the United States have also pushed for closer ties with Russia. And while the war in Ukraine featured high in bilateral negotiations, it is Iran’s nuclear program that matters to Washington, perhaps even more than Ukraine. Moscow has a great deal of influence over Iran especially given the two’s expanding relations since 2022 when heavily sanctioned and ostracized by the West Russia found in Iran a partner to rely on. In a way, Russia could be willing to exchange Washington’s concession over Ukraine for dropping support for Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
It highlights the idea that Russia has never been ready to have a nuclear Iran to its south. Rather over the past few years Moscow has been engaged in well-calibrated foreign policy whereby it signaled support for Tehran and its nuclear ambitions but short enough of seeing the Islamic Republic going fully nuclear.
In these circumstances Iran finds itsels in a complicated position. It has to negotiate with the United States and perhaps even has to make concessions on some key aspects of the nuclear program. Surely, the negotiations might break down along the way. Distrust runs high and there is also Israel which seek complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program. Nevertheless, the overall geopolitical context might still be favorable to a certain agreements between Washington and Tehran.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.
