【明報文章】The Middle East is amid its one of the most unstable phases in the modern period and the crux of the problem again revolves around the Islamic Republic of Iran. Being geographically and economically one of the most important players in the Middle East, Iran also appeals to religious feelings of Shia muslims and often to non-Shia believers too. This makes the country a central piece in the regional and, in fact, global geopolitics.
Yet the Islamic Republic experiences a difficult period in its foreign policy which augurs badly for the country’s position in the region. Firstly, Iran’s Axis of Resistance – a sprawling network of non-state and militarized actors across the Middle East – has been battered by the Israeli forces over the past year and a half. Hamas in the Gaza Strip has been nearly totally defeated, while Hezbollah in Lebanon badly weakened.
In Syria, the rule of the Assad dynasty fell in December 2024 which marked a real turn in the fortunes of the Axis given Syria’s role as a vital link in Iran’s efforts to build a land corridor to the Mediterranean Sea. The Houthis, another active member of the Axis, in Yemen have been likewise targeted by the US and Israel to limit their activities which hampered the maritime commerce through the Red Sea and at times even threatened Israeli soil.
Then comes Iran’s mounting disagreements with Turkey which acted as a key supporter of the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, a Sunni organization which came to power in Syria. Ankara and Tehran have always been competitors but mostly managed to compartmentalize their differences. This time around, however, it becomes increasingly difficult to achieve this kind of understanding given the sudden shift of balance of power in Syria and Ankara’s growing influence in the South Caucasus.
Even in Iraq, where Iran has held much of influence since the US invasion of 2003 and the Shiites’ coming to power, Tehran now experiences pressure from Baghdad and the US to limit and eventually give up on the links with the Shiite non-state actors. Iraq plays an even more critical part in Iran’s strategy of keeping foes at bay. It also serves as a veritable bridge to build direct links with the rest of the Middle East.
More broadly, the return of Donald Trump to the White House ushered in a period of heightened pressure from Washington in the form of the Maximum Pressure campaign. This includes ever harsher sanctions and more effective implementation of specific sanctions on exports of Iranian oil – in many ways a lifeline for the Iranian economy. Both Israel and the US see the next few years as decisive when they would be able to finally settle the “Iran problem”. They now resort to a mixture of military and diplomatic pressure, and also signal that they are ready, if necessary, to use a hardline military approach which envisages total destruction of Iranian nuclear facilities.
Another, perhaps much more uncomfortable development for the Islamic Republic relates to the developing rapprochement between the US and Russia. Their ongoing negotiations on Ukraine are in fact an effort to find a common ground on much broader issues such as the Middle East and the security architecture on the European continent. Iran fears that part of these improving US-Russia relations, Washington would seek Moscow’s constructive engagement on the Iran issue.
Indeed, though Iran has been important to Moscow’s efforts to develop a full scale pivot to Asia after 2022, Ukraine remains central to Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. It is closer and historically important to Moscow and decisive influence over the country would allow Russia to emphasize its grandeur as a major power. Therefore, it will be no surprise if Moscow would actually limit cooperation with Iran in such key areas as the nuclear program or military ties.
Nevertheless, Iran remains steadfast. Its Axis of Resistance continues to exist as none of its members, except for the Assad dynasty, has ceased to exist. Tehran sees this difficult period as only a temporary setback even if it takes years to reconstitute the Axis back to its pre-2023 period when Iran’s forward-defense strategy reached its peak.
Nor will Moscow completely abandon Iran as it will harm Russian interests which are pinned on the hope that the work on expansion of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) corridor running to the Persian Gulf will continue. Surprisingly, the wealthy Arab states could support Iran as well since they fear that too much pressure on Tehran will have severe repercussions on the rest of the Middle East and might result in a major war.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.
