【明報文章】Donald Trump’s second presidency is full of challenges and potential advantages. One region where Beijing could garner substantial rewards is the Middle East. From Syria to Iran to the Gulf region the US will face a series of challenges which would need urgent handling from Washington. In the end, however, it could provide an opportunity to Beijing to step up its activism across the region.
In case of Iran, despite some signals to the contrary, Trump is expected to ramp up pressure through additional sanctions to stiffle the Islamic Republic’s shadow oil fleet which serves as a lifeline for its battered economy. The maximum pressure campaign back in Trump’s first term did indeed corner the Iranian economy, but this has not made the Islamic Republic any more pliable in future rounds of negotiations. In fact, it could be argued that the opposite transpired with Iran now reportedly able of building a few nuclear weapons in a limited amount of time.
Moreover, despite the maximum pressure campaign Iran has been able to evade US-imposed sanctions by building closer ties with Russia, China, India and others. Even if Tehran agrees to engage the US through negotiations, it is unlikely that Trump will push for moderate goals given that there is an understanding that Iran currently is in a weaker position because of what happened to its Axis of Resistance and could therefore be susceptible to greater pressure. But Iran has time and again proved to be unpredictable and it is very much likely that the potential US-Iran negotiations would not lead to anything meaningful leaving Washington and its ally Israel with a potential military solution to Tehran’s nuclear program. Overall, the maximum pressure campaign might futher drive Iran to expand its Asian pivot. Ties with Russia are expanding as evidenced by the most recent bilateral treaty. Tehran’s relations with Beijing have likewise shown prospects of more extensive scope but so far Beijing has been cautious given the threat of sanctions.
Another urgent matter for Washington will be Syria where its new rulers are still designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States, a grave measure which effectively bans any cooperation with the grouping. This also extends to the whole of Syria, which, ravaged by the civil war since 2011, is presently in a dire need of external financial support. To this should be added a string of sanctions such as a status of a state sponsor of terrorism, which touch upon the state of Syria itself. Some of the sanctions would need years to be revoked, which means that reconstruction of the country will be a painful process.
If there is no alleviation of sanctions, Syria might well have to look elsewhere that will fit into the model of multi-vector foreign policy which is pursued by nearly all Middle East countries as a recipe for attaining advantages on international stage by playing one big actor against the other. But perhaps it is nowhere seen as well as in the Gulf countries’ diplomacy.
Since under the Trump administration China-US relations would likely be tense, the spillover effect will be felt in the Gulf region. Yet the problem is that over the past years the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has grown closer to China, driven by substantial Chinese investments and declining confidence in U.S. ability to provide security highlighted by the Iranian-backed Houthi attacks on Saudi oil fields in 2019. The Gulf states’ ties with China extend into key areas like technology, security, and finance. For instance, China’s role in Gulf infrastructure and AI development continues to grow. Additionally, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have procured Chinese military technologies, including drones and ballistic missile systems. This reliance on China has been complemented by the Gulf states’ inclusion in China-led multilateral initiatives: Saudi Arabia’s promotion to dialogue partner status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and its invitation to join the BRICS+ group.
Therefore, the Gulf states will pursue a multi-vector foreign policy, reducing their dependence on any single global power. This strategy allows them to maintain strong ties with both Washington and Beijing, reaping benefits from both partnerships without committing exclusively to either. The Gulf states’ multi-vector foreign policy reflects broader trends across Eurasia, where nations are striving to diversify their international partnerships. Compared to four years ago, the GCC’s approach to regional challenges, including relations with Iran, has softened. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are no longer aligned with Trump’s hardline stance on Tehran and prefer de-escalation and diplomacy.
Overall, Trump’s second presidency is expected to be disruptive for the Middle East. This will provide greater room for China mostly because the era of uncertainty and Washingtin’s increasingly transactional approach pushes the regional actors to pursue multi-vector foreign policy.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.
