【明報文章】The war on Ukraine transformed Russia’s foreign policy. Moscow is now prioritizing its the Ukraine battlefield over its other foreign policy engagements and the result is not positive for Kremlin’s projection of great power status.
With the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria in December 2024 Russia lost its major ally in the Middle East. The operation of the two military bases Moscow has held on Syria’s Mediterranean coastline are now increasingly questioned as the negotiations with the new rulers in Damascus seem to have led to little results.
Moreover, the fall of Assad also signals diminution of Russia’s position in the Mediterranean and undermines its ability to connect with its security personnels spread across the African continent. Indeed, the withdrawal from Syria would be devastating for Moscow’s African ambitions as its Russia’s Africa Corps present in Sahel and other parts of the continent will remain without proper support.
Even in Libya where Russia is transporting its military assets from Syria not all is clear with the commitment from Field Marshal Khalifa Hifter, who heads the Libyan National Army, and has so far avoided giving the Russian side assurances on allowing formal Russian presence in the country.
Russia has helped Assad before and it, along with Iran, was expected to do it again in late 2024 when a lightining rebel offensive began. It did not materialize partly because Assad was too weak, partly because the Islamic Republic and its allies within the Axis of Resistance were battered by Israel. Yet it was Russia’s geopolitical preoccupation with its stalled war in Ukraine that distracted Moscow.
Yet the watchers of Russia’s evolving position in Eurasia have long indicated that following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 Moscow’s position has been diminishing simultaneously in several region which Kremlin has considered as part of its zone of geopolitical influence.
The South Caucasus is one of them where three coutnries, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia has a a history of complex ties with their former imperial patron. Yet, it was the war in Ukraine that caused sudden shifting of allegiances mostly to Russia’s detriment.
In case of Armenia, which has long been Russia’s ally, the country is now increasingly intent on building closer ties with the EU and the US. For instance, Yerevan has just recently signed a strategic partnership agreement with Washington, introduced a bill which would oblige the country to seek EU membership. These are built on an array of other moves such as minimizing arms purchases from Russia and expanding security ties with Western and Asian countries, such as France and India. In short, Armenia seeks diversification of foreign relations and by extension this means Russia’s diminishing influence.
Yet what is more interesting here is what prompted this shift in Armenia’s foreign policy was Russia’s unwillingness and perhaps inability to extend support for its ally when the latter dearly needed. After 2020 second Nagorno-Karabakh war which ended in Baku’s astounding victory, Moscow sent its peacekeeping force to the then still existing enclave within Azerbaijan. Once the full-scale war in Ukraine began, Russian forces’ position in Karabakh became untenable. Russian troops stood by when in September 2023 Azerbaijani forces launched an offensive to recapture the remaining parts of the Armenian-populated territory, which in turn led to the complete withdrawal of the Russian troops in a few months.
With Azerbaijan regaining its territory its foreign policy became more confident and less dependent on Russia. Given Baku’s already close ties with its traditional ally, Turkey, the Russian vector in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is set to become less pronounced over the coming years. Indeed, the latest instance of the downed Azerbaijani plane caused by the alleged Russian missile highlighted the existing tensions between the two countries.
Then comes Georgia, which has pursued a pragmatic foreign policy over the past years by abstaining from joining anti-Russian sanctions, expanding bilateral trade ties and overall minimizing its pursuit of integration into the EU and NATO. Though much of it has been charactarized as a pro-Russian turn in Georgia’s foreign policy, a closer look reveals a much more nuanced development.
Georgia, whose 20 percent of the territory are still occupied by Russia, does indeed pursue more stable relations with Moscow. Yet the country has likewise expanded ties with other actors such as China, Turkey, and Gulf countries. Moreover, despite difficulties in relations with the EU, Georgia has nevertheless remained commited to its membership prospects. Therefore, the country’s relations with Russia should be seen more as a part of a multi-vector foreign policy.
Conscious of limits of its power Russia’s foreign policy toward the South Caucasus has taken new twists. Moscow has to be considerate toward Iran’s and Turkey’s influence in the region. Over the past years, Turkey’s and Iran’s influence has been growing in the region via trade, bilateral political ties with the region’s three countries etc. This marks the end of the age of Russia’s exclusive dominance in the South Caucasus pushing the region closer to the Middle East and other actors such as China and to a certain extent the West. Historically speaking, this is actually a return to normal practice, with Middle Eastern powers traditionally the most influential in the region. For Iran and Turkey, Russian hegemony was always an aberration. The process could yield benefits for the West. After all, shifting tectonic plates create opportunities for multiple actors to project power. But the EU and United States are limited by geographical distance, and the absence of significant economic levers. Turkey and Iran are both nearby, and eager to accrue more influence in the South Caucasus.
Overall, Russia’s posture in the Middle East and closer home is in what could be called a managed decline. The war in Ukraine has sucked all of Russia’s resources and attention. Prioritization has brought defeats far in Syria and in the near neighborhood. The prospects for improvement this situation will largely depend on what happens on Ukraine’s battlefield. But even if Russia gains what it wants from Kyiv, complete reversal to its recent geopolitical backsliding will be hard to achieve.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.
