【明報文章】As the world still grapples with the reasons behind Syria’s former ruler Bashar al-Assad’s sudden fall, one important development has remained little discussed – Syria’s failed rehabilitation process.
The momentum behind a cautious re-integration of Syria back into the Arab League and the new Middle East geopolitical order slowly emerged from after 2015 when Russia joined Iran in supporting militarily the incumbent but crumbling Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad. Once the military balance of power in Syria shifted in favor of Damascus and a longer-term truce was established later in March 2020, the belief among the Arab states that the Syrian government could be toppled started to change.
The Arab countries gradually began reconsidering their ties with Damascus. For instance, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were among the first ones and argued for Syria’s gradual reintegration into the regional order in exchange for cooperation from the country’s ruling elite on such issues as curbing of the drug flow, refugee issues, integration of the political opposition into the new Syrian government etc. Indeed, the UAE then followed by Jordan and Bahrain, all restored bilateral ties with Syria. Oman, characterized by its reconciliation diplomacy, was another player which had been actively working on normalizing relations with Syria believing that a softer approach would be more effective in resolving the existing problems.
Among more immediate reasons, a devastating earthquake in Turkey and Syria in early 2023 contributed to the opening which was further crystallized with the Syrian president’s visit to the UAE in March 2023. Simultaneously, Egyptian, Jordanian and other Arab officials began visiting Damascus. Later in May the Arab League reinstated Syria’s membership, which marked a turning point in the relations between Syria and other Arab states bent on changing the Syrian leadership since 2011 when Damascus’ position was suspended within the League following a brutal crackdown on the protests which engulfed the country.
In 2023 Jordan proposed a plan consisting of financing for reconstruction projects of up to $400 billion. In order to help an economy that saw its GDP cut in half between 2010 and 2020, Arab allies pleedged to encourage other nations to restore relations with Syria and use their political capital in Western capital to push for lifting of sanctions imposed on Syria. The project was not contingent on accountability from the Damascus government whether it is about crackdown on protesters, battling corruption, or deteriorated conditions for Sunni population. What was however expected was the cooperation from the Syrian government on creating viable security conditions inside the country and along the borders. Also in 2023 the Arab League established a special committee to measure a tentative progress on fulfillment of demands laid out by the League, while in May 2024 Saudi Arabia re-opened an embassy in Damascus.
Syria’s partial rehabilitation fits into broader geopolitical developments across the Middle East. First among them is a series of reconciliation tracks among major regional rivals. Normalization between Iran and Saudi Arabia is a good example when in March 2023 the two arch-enemies, with active diplomacy of Oman, other Arab intermediaries but also China, opted for de-escalation from Yemen to Iraq to Syria. Riyadh and Tehran remain regional rivals, but since the two have faced internal troubles from social to economic problems they became interested in minimizing geopolitical tensions across the Middle East.
Another major reconciliation process was between Qatar and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and Turkey and Egypt. More ambitious and perhaps with far bigger repercussion was the developing Israel-Arab reconciliation, primarily between the Jewish state and Saudi Arabia. As a part of the Abraham Accords, which were proposed and managed by the United States under the leadership of the then President Donald Trump, the Saudi kingdom would recognize Israel in exchange for a separate US-Saudi military and security pact.
Yet the momentum behind the normalization drive has somewhat subsided ever since Syria’s full rehabilitation turned out to be impossible largely because of the absence of complete security in the country but also intransigeance from the Syrian leadership. Indeed Damascus has its own terms for rehabilitation and the Al-Assad’s government is unwilling to concede to any demands from the Arab League or other neighbors which would undermine Syria’s interests. From Damascus’ perspective, the time was on its side as Syria seemed to have weathered the gravest crisis and was more confident leveraging a number of tools from migration to arms and drug flows. Damascus was also confident as it had regained control over most of the country’s territory and enjoyed strong Russian and Iranian military support – a stark contrast to the Arab countries which held greater influence in the beginning of the conflict in Syria.
Much of it, however, turned out to be illusory – the Assad dynasty’s fall proved once again how unpredictable the Middle East is.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.