【明報文章】The Middle East is in crisis. Increasingly it seems to be more of a long-term process rather than an aberration, as many thought when the war in Gaza began. The conflict and the spiralling tensions between Israel and Iran keeps the region highly unstable. The Gaza war also prevented quick Israeli-Arab reconciliation ardently championed by the United States. Moreover, amid the crisis China and Russia have further further expanded their diplomatic engagement with the Middle East.
The region is far from seeing clear geopolitical division lines. All countries now prefer diversfied foreign ties which help them to maneuver and attain greater place on international arena. Take Saudi Arabia or UAE as both are reaching out to China and to a certain extent Russia in an effort to rebalance their foreign policy options. Their goal is not about ditching the US as their traditional security partner but rather to show that there are other actors beyond Washington which Abu-Dhabi and Riyadh could build rapport with.
In other words, the region is undergoing a resurgence of multi-vector foreign policy, which invites multiple outisde powers to exert influence in the Middle East. This could be dangerous as multiplicity of actors leads to a highly congested geopolitical space where none of big powers has enough say to achieve major diplomatic goals. Yet what the Middle East's recent history showed is that a single power striving to dominate the region has often led to poor foreign policy choices and increasing opposition from local players.
The US' dominating position in 1990s-2010s serves as a good example of how a single power is unable to bring peace in the Middle East. Multiplicity of actors therefore could be far more advantageous, though not guarantor of eventual success. At least, greater Chinese, Russia, and Indian influence simultaneous with the traditional Western geopolitical clout could create a fertile ground for balance of power in the Middle East. Balancing would not solve persisting territorial problems in Gaza and elsewhere, but it will certainly create better conditions for diplomatic activity between major powers and therefore facilitate the decrease of tensions.
Should any power decide to carry out a major military campaign, multiplicity of greater powers would serve as a powerful balance in moderating emerging crises. In short, this system could be broadly similar to what kind of geopolitical system emerged in early 19th century Europe following the fall of Napoleon and France's defeat.
Another major development in the Middle East is a shift in Iran's Axis of Resistance. As a sprawling network of militarized groups spread across the Middle East, the Axis has served Iran's foreign policy of advancing Tehran's interests in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Gaza. A look at the map reveals that it is not so much religious sentiments that motivate the Islamic Republic, but rather the ambition to reach the Mediterranean and Red seas in an effort to gain access to richer territories and perhaps even control major sea routes (as the case with Houthi attacks on commercial ships has revealed).
The war in Gaza changed the state of play within the Axis. If before October 2023, the network was turning increasingly decentralized with its members seemingly becoming less dependent on Iran, the ongoing Israeli campaign forged ever greater bond between the Axis' constituents and Iran. Neither can survive without the other and given Hamas' heavy losses and infrastructure destruction, Iran cannot afford a larger war. Even with the killing of the Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran the latter has to remain cautious with its response.
Iran does not want its retaliatory move to turn into a major war. Rather Tehran is playing a longer-term game as it works slowly and steadily to reduce American and Israeli influence. In the event of a major war, Iran will have to use its main ally in the conflict, the central player of the Axis of Resistance, the "Party of God", or Hezbollah. Iran is well aware that, in the event of a wider war, Hezbollah will not be able to defeat Israel, leading to the weakening of this important player.
Iran needs Hezbollah to contain Israel, to distract Israel and drain its resources. A war with Israel, where the US will most likely openly side with Tel-Aviv, will further weaken Iran's Axis of Resistance. Such reasoning is particularly relevant at a time when Hamas is on the brink of total defeat.
The shifts within Iran's Axis thus reflect wider changes taking place in the Middle East. The region is on the brink of a wider conflagration, but a closer analysis reveals that neither Iran nor Israel really want a major conflict. Neither can afford it and there are also other major and smaller powers which are set to lose much from a potential conflagration.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia.
